Complicity in Crimes Against Humanity and Refugee Protection: Lessons from Carillo Vivas and Ahuday Cases
- Apol Apuntar

- Aug 1
- 2 min read

In Canadian refugee and immigration law, individuals who have been complicit in crimes against humanity are excluded from refugee protection, regardless of their claims of reform efforts or lack of direct participation in abuses. Recent Federal Court decisions, including Carillo Vivas v. Canada and Ahuday v. Canada, highlight the rigorous application of this legal principle, emphasizing the significance of one’s role within government structures linked to systemic human rights violations.
The Carillo Vivas Decision: Complicity in the Venezuelan Prison System
In Carillo Vivas, the Federal Court upheld the Refugee Appeal Division’s (RAD) decision that Adolfo Alexander Carillo Vivas, a senior official in Venezuela’s Ministry of the People’s Power for the Penitentiary Services (MPPSP), was complicit in crimes against humanity. Despite his claims of attempting prison reforms, the Court found that his senior roles, including responsibility for infrastructure and living conditions in the “New Regime” prisons, amounted to a significant and knowing contribution to the mistreatment and inhumane conditions endured by inmates.
The decision reinforced the framework established in Ezokola v. Canada, under which complicity arises not from direct involvement in abuses but from voluntary, significant, and knowing contributions to an organization’s criminal purpose. The Court rejected the Applicant’s attempts to minimize his role or shift blame to systemic issues or criminal gangs controlling parts of the prison system. Importantly, the ruling clarified that even administrative or indirect participation within a system that perpetuates crimes against humanity can warrant exclusion from refugee protection.
The Ahuday Case and the Philippine Tokhang Campaign
Similarly, in Ahuday v. Canada, the Court addressed claims related to the applicant’s involvement in the Duterte administration’s anti-drug campaign, known as “Tokhang.” This campaign has been widely condemned internationally for extrajudicial killings and severe abuses against suspected drug offenders.
The applicant in Ahuday was found inadmissible on the grounds of complicity, reflecting the principle that those who hold authority or perform duties within government programs associated with gross human rights violations cannot claim refugee protection, even if they deny direct perpetration of abuses. The case underscores Canada’s commitment to ensuring that its refugee protection regime does not shelter individuals linked to state-sponsored violence or crimes against humanity.
Legal Principles and Implications: Crimes Against Humanity
Both cases demonstrate Canada’s strict application of Section 98 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) and Article 1F(a) of the Refugee Convention, which exclude individuals from refugee protection if there are serious reasons to believe they have committed or been complicit in crimes against humanity.
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Ezokola v. Canada provides the key test for complicity, focusing on the individual’s voluntary, significant, and knowing contribution to a group’s criminal activities. This approach avoids guilt by mere association but requires careful examination of one’s actual role and responsibilities.
Conclusion
The Carillo Vivas and Ahuday decisions send a clear message that holding senior or administrative positions within state systems responsible for human rights abuses can lead to exclusion from refugee protection in Canada. Claims of reform efforts or limited direct involvement will not shield applicants from inadmissibility if they made a significant and knowing contribution to systemic crimes.
These rulings reinforce the importance of rigorous evidence assessment and contextual analysis in refugee proceedings and affirm Canada’s commitment to international human rights standards.




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